Pedestrian

Here is part II of the article.

Part I

————————————

How did the hardliners’ project begin?

The hardliners were appointed to create a military government, homogeneous and clear of dissent, to pave the way for the new leadership. For this purpose, Ahmadinejad was chosen as president in 2005 and most of the positions on his cabinets were taken by former military officials. The hardliners’ plan was written out in “two parts”, for two presidential terms. In his first term, Ahmadinejad was appointed to either control or destroy the potentials created in civil society during the reformist era. The aim of this period was to “return to square one”. In this period, student associations, NGOs, political parties and the press were put under excruciating pressure, to attempt to return to the pre-1997 era [before Khatami].

The most important part of the project however, was to do with Ahmadnejad’s second term. The second term was a “period of elimination”. Two groups of political players had to be eliminated. One group which was a “barrier”, and one group which was the “goal”. The reformists were a barrier to the hardline project. It could be predicted that they would be vocal in their opposition to election fraud. So a scenario was written to widely arrest and eliminate the reformists, by accusing them of a “velvet revolution” and “soft overthrow”.

A second group which was to be eliminated consisted of moderate conservative politicians who had traditional been an ally to Rafsanjani. The goal was to eliminate Rafsanjani and his allies, because, in the view of hardliners, this group would have a big role in determining the next leader. Before the election, and in Ahmadinejad’s first term, there was great effort to take many of Rafsanjani’s close allies to court, people like Rowhani, Mousavian and Mehdi Hashemi. And that attempt was not very successful. The process of eliminating Rafsanjani was to begin with Ahmadinejad’s televised debate, and by firing up the nation, it was to be carried out swiftly.

Thus, by imprisoning more than 500 political and civil activists, and eliminating conservatives from the top of the ruling establishment’s hierarchy, a suitable environment for the period of transition was to be prepared. In such an environment, there would even be an appropriate chance for changing to constitution to be more inline with the principle of “seeking and appointing”. But as we saw, all did not go according to the hardliners plan. The green movement was born.

What really Happened?

The discussion about how the green movement was born requires a lot more space, and will  not be the focus of this article. But what is quite obvious is that this movement was a blow to the hardliner project which they had been planning for years. Not only did they not achieve an appropriate environment for transferring leadership, but rather, the political landscape of the country was badly shaken. The hardliners expected to see hopelessness and silence from political activists and the public, after a brief period of protest following the election. But just the opposite happened. The protests saw no end and they became louder and louder every day. Even those people who had previously been apolitical and disinterested, got involved. Thus, not only were the political not silenced,the apolitical became active as well.

The hardliners project was defeated. The reformists stood their ground and did not back down. Imprisoning the reformists was not a victorious strategy, and did not have the desired result. The resilience of some reformists actually gave more life to their cause. Rafsanjani with his insightful brilliance, deterred any attempts by the hardliners to be eliminated. Not only did he not lose his position, he wisely kept his distance with the leadership.

The hardliners solution for this period of transfer was a simple minded “the use of brute force”. They assumed that technology and money would be enough. But the result was just the opposite of what they had planned for. The legitimacy of the system was greatly tarnished, and over night, its national and international appeal was damaged. Many of the system’s previous supporters became doubtful. The stability of the system was greatly undermined and the fracture between the people and the political elite became wider.

Thus, the effort of the hardliners was to return things to the way they were before the election. They tried to substitute their betrayal of the nation with violence. But whatever they did, it created a worse situation.

The blow that the hardliners forced on the system was worse than what any opposition could do. The damage and destruction brought on the system after the  election was the sole responsibility of military and quasi military forces which were the masterminds of the project. Only relying on their might and financial backing, they jeopardized the very existence of the system.

What was the role of pragmatic conservatives?

Last year, a group of conservatives had sent a message to reformists, asking them not to announce a candidate for the presidential election, and instead to back the conservative candidates (someone like Qalibaf, Larijani, etc). The argument was that if the reformists have no candidate, there will less of a consensus on Ahmadinejad, and the moderate conservative would win. In the view of these pragmatic conservatives, that was the only way to unseat Ahmadinejad. The reformists of course turned down this offer. In their view there was no way to be sure that a consensus around Ahmadinejad could be broken. The conservatives took orders after all, and the harliners were bent on keeping Ahmadinejad in power. The only power that could unseat Ahmadinejad would be a nation wide momentum, like that of the 2nd Khordaad [when Khatami was elected], not backroom deals between political factions. Thus, the reformists put their efforts in nominating Khatami again, and recreating 2nd of Khordaad.

Now, after nearly a year, individuals like Ali Motahari send letters to Mousavi and ask him to back down, and leave the job to moderate conservatives. The likes of Motahari argue that so long as the reformists are active, the hardliner and conservative consensus around  Ahmadinejad will not be broken. But if the reformists back down, the conservatives themselves will take care of Ahmadinejad.

This time too, the reformists and Mousavi’s response was negative. If Karoubi and Mousavi back down, not only will this not weaken Ahmadinejad, it will allow for a swift move on the part of hardliners to eliminate conservatives as well. The only reason that Rafsanjani’s allies and moderate conservatives have gone unscathed is that the hardliners have been busy with the repression and silencing of the green movement. The pragmatic conservatives underestimate the hardliners. If the hardliners remove the “barrier” that is the green movement, they will go straight for the conservatives. We must not forget that the actual aim was Rafsanjani and his allies, and the project remains unfinished. If the hardliners are not deterred, the pragmatic conservatives will not fare any better than the reformists.

During the months following the birth of the green movement, pragmatic conservatives tried to steer clear of the fights so that the two reformist and hardline factions would wear each other down. So that once both these factions were completely weakened, they could emerge as “the third force” or “saviors” and take control of government. But what happened was that the conflict between reformists and hardliners grew worse by the day and the political landscape was becoming ever more polarized and radicalized to a point where the entire system was at risk and there was no place for the conservatives.  That is why these conservatives decided to play a role in the events, after seven months of silence. A mediating role. The letter Mohsen Rezaie wrote to the leader, their attempts to reform election laws and to take Saeed Mortazavi [Tehran ex prosecutor general] to court, an attempt at changing the head of the police forces and the IRGC, parliament’s reports on government’s violations of law, their efforts to free imprisoned reformists and their numerous interviews in criticizing the government were all efforts on the part of pragmatic conservatives to end the conflict. Their efforts became more apparent after 22 Bahman [31st anniversary of the revolution].

Part III

What is waiting ahead?

. . . .

The destination was to begin the journey

. . . .

The Iranian New Year is called Norouz [New Day]. So besides the regular spring cleaning, carpet washing and new year shopping, families try to “new” everything. If we ever needed anything for our house, furniture, appliances, etc, unless it was badly needed, my parents would prefer to change that item near Norouz, so it would, as they say, “start fresh” in the new year. My mom always made us refurbish our sock drawer. All the old socks have to be thrown out [unless still usable] and replaced with new ones.

This policy can of course go too far and become wasteful. But at least the way it was done in our family, it was never like that. It was just a simple rule: if you need something and it can wait a while, buy it for Norouz.

As kids growing up outside of Iran, my siblings and I did our yearly shopping for school supplies and clothes and shoes not in September but in March. It is an absolute must that the kids have some thing new to wear for the new year celebrations and my parents made it a ritual for us … and we loved it.

One of the very best episodes of The Stories of Majid [Ghesehayeh Majid] I wrote about months ago is the one titled “Clothes for the New Year”. Majid has his heart set on a new suit for Norouz, and his grandmother can’t afford one. So he sets out to get the neighborhood tailor to alter a used suit a friend of the family has given them. The problem is that the tailor is very busy with new orders, and has no interest in spending time on alterations for Majid.

Now multiply this story by 12 to 14 million (estimated population of Tehran). Every family, no matter how financially privileged or unprivileged, tries to renew something in their house or for the family. The story of Majid is the story of many kids in Iran.

In the public school I went to, you could tell the family’s financial status by the amount of “newness” scrawled over the students after the holidays. Some would come to school on April 4th [first day of school after the holidays] soaking in new gear from head to toe. Other students would settle for a new pair of shoes, a new bag, or even just a new pencil case.

The annual Norouz Bazaar also offers families with reasonably priced goods, and is always overflowing with people. You can buy pretty much everything at the bazaar, from kitchen appliances to shoes and nuts and chocolate. As a result, the traffic in Tehran is just horrendous. Just horrible this time of year. But somehow, I don’t mind it. The weather is warm and breezy, and there is this sense of excitement in the air, and I just can’t get angry or miserable at the traffic. I just can’t.

Here are photos from the bazaar and Tehran’s even busier than usual metro stations this year.

Emad Bahavar [1979] is a political activist, writer and the head of “Supporters of Khatami and Mousavi” in the 2009 presidential campaign. He was arrested shortly after the election, and released after two months. He was detained once more, two days ago.

His recent article in Roozonline, “The destination was to begin the journey” was the reason behind his recent arrest. I think it is an extremely poignant, intelligent piece, and I will be bringing you the translation in 3 parts. You’ll have to wait for part III to understand the name (or read the original at Roozonline), but despite the completely different worlds, it took me back to Robert Frost’s two roads.

[update: Emad Bahavar was just released]

——————————————–

The destination was to begin the journey
Roozonline – March 6th, 2010

It is now quite obvious that what happened before and after the presidential election was a result of a very clumsy solution devised by security and military forces, to solve the “crisis of leadership” in the future system of the Islamic Republic. A solution that did not solve the crisis, and in fact, inflicted irreversible injury and damage to the very structure and legitimacy of the political system.

The ruling elite try to deny the existence of any political crisis, and to show that indeed it is the reformists who have reached a dead end. But analyzing their behavior and their responses to the aftermath of the election and the “green movement”, proves the opposite. A “political crisis”, in its most urgent form presents itself as a “crisis of legitimacy”, and a “crisis of legitimacy”, at its worse, becomes a “crisis of leadership”. Thus, not only is the system in a political crisis right now, this crisis is no ordinary quandary and is the worst of its kind.

“Who will be the next leader?” “What sort of mechanism will be used to choose the next leader?” “Is the current system of Leadership of the Jurist, in the current context of the constitution, sustainable?” These are questions which reformists, principalists and conservatives have been grappling with. The events of the recent election are in a way the product of different groups thinking of these questions. The events are in fact, a direct result of “serious measures” taken by the most hardline base of the establishment, in response to those questions. The result of the explosive, destructive actions following the election brought to light the very fact that a solution to these questions is not possible by “simple minded solutions” and the “crisis” and “dead end” argued here is much more serious to be solved by an adventurous wing of the establishment on its own.

What was this all about?

These events first seriously began when the most hardline wings of the system, composed of military groups, quasi-miliatry groups and extremist clerics, devised a strategy for “the transfer of leadership”. When Ayatollah Khamenei began his leadership of the country, most groups in the ruling establishment formed a consensus on his appointment and by acting above and beyond any faction or group, he was able to give the system relative stability and solidity. The election of a reformist president during his time, also gave many groups the belief that there is a chance to be active in the system and to reform it, without jeopardizing the stability of the entire system. But there was no guarantee that this stability would continue on forever.

There was no guarantee that when it came time to transfer the leadership to a “new leadership”, the same political stability would remain. By all accounts and all analysis, the system would experience great tension during this period and this tension might undermine its very existence. That is why all political factions within the system, from reformist to conservative to hardline, attempted to put forth a solution to this quandary in the frameworks of their own beliefs. For reasons of which I can not write about, it was the hardliners who were given the opportunity to carry out their solution. They were appointed to establish a “military rule”, a homogeneous ruling system empty and silent of dissent, to create an appropriate circumstance for the period of the transfer of leadership. This is how in 2005, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” was chosen to serve as president and to prepare suitable conditions for this period.

What was the hardliners’ solution?

The worst kind of political stability is when the future of an entire system is put to depend on the future of one person, because the smallest change in the top of the hierarchy will influence the entire system. In a monarchy, this quandary has been relatively solved by hereditary rule and the selection of the children or kin of the monarch as the next rulers. In this system, the death of the king and the succession of his son is seen as a legitimate, natural process, and does not undermine the entirety of the system. But in the current ruling system of the Islamic Republic, the mechanisms are neither monarchical or democratic. From one angle, it seems that the Assembly of Experts is chose by the nation to elect a leader, from another angle, the approbation supervision of the Guardian Council over the members of the assembly, means that a substantial number of the nation’s real representatives never make their way through and thus have no say in the selection of the leader. Thus, the very principal of legitimacy and admissibility of the leader by the people [in the tradition of democratic systems] is undermined with the role of “approbation supervision” of the the Guardian Council.

So what was the solution the hardliners put forth? As we know, the hardliners follow extremist clerics like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who never believed in the selection of the leader by the Assembly of Experts, and has always disapproved of this article of the constitution. The emphasis of Ayatollah Yazdi on the appointment of the leader is based on a theory of “seeking and appointing” -  not electing. Thus, the solution of the hardliners for the transition process is something like a hereditary monarchy, with the different that the new leader does not necessarily have to be next of kin. In the view of Ayatollah Yazdi, the current leader has ways to seek the opinion of the twelfth Imam [who will return from occultation one day], and when notified of the Imam’s choice, inform the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts will in turn swear allegiance to the new leader on behalf of the nation and through this mechanism, the people’s approval will be satisfied. Thus, the new leader will be appointed by the old one (he will be “sought and appointed”), will have holy legitimacy, and through the approval of the Assembly of Experts (an indirect swearing of allegiance by the people) also have the people’s approval.

The belief of the hardliners is noting but a recreation of theory of the caliphate. The Assembly of Experts and parliament are nothing but a seal of approval for the caliphate. Hardline Shi’as in this way are very similar to hardline Sunnis. They believe that by implementing these theories, the tensions during the transition period will reach a minimum, and these tensions will be limited to insignificant political dissent and disapproval. In this way, the old leader will appoint the new one, and the Assembly of Experts will approve.

But the real quandary for the hardliners was implementing these plans, not writing them, as they had been written long ago, from the time of Sheykh Fazlollah. How can it ever be brought to fruition in the time of reformist publications, numerous newspapers, well known intellectuals, and clerics deeply opposed to such views? Is the implementation of such a project possible in such a pluralistic, politicized environment?

How did the hardliners’ project Begin?

. . . .

What really happened?

. . . .

What was the role of pragmatic conservatives?

. . . .

What is waiting ahead?

. . . .

The destination was to begin the journey

. . . .

After writing a little about Azad University, for some time now, I’ve been meaning to write about Payam-e Nour [Messenger of Light] University.

The university was first established in 1989, as a distance learning institution where students had the option of attending one class per week and taking their exams at the university, or having it mailed to them at home.

In recent years, to meet the growing demand, the university has greatly expanded. With the rise of Ahmadinejad, it has also served as the academic backbone of the current establishment. Front runners in Ahmadinejad’s administration have neither the ancestral/religious weight of the likes of Larijanis, etc or the academic/scholarly weight of former heads of the establishment. Many in the current administration rely on Payam-e Nour to give them their scholarly bend which it seems, the Iranian officials think they must have. Thus, a number of Ahmadinejad BFFs hold professorial positions at the university, including Mohammad Ali Ramin (even though they do not even have university degrees consistent with what they teach. When asked about this, Ramin replied that he has done a lot of “personal reading” and that’s why he is fit to teach). The reason why they went for Payam-e Nour is that given the administrative hierarchy, it is much easier to penetrate than more renowned universities where such a thing would be met with a wave of criticism from well known academics inside Iran … and would thus raise quite a stir.

On the other hand, you probably have not heard about Ahmadinejad’s infiltration of Payam-e Nour, now, have you?

Now Farce News [the media wing of Ahmadinejad & Co] quotes the head of the Qom Payam-e Nour University as saying that “Payam-e Nour is considered one of the top five universities in the world.” [I've put a photo of the article above]. Cleric Reza Ali Karami further went on to say that the university is ranked with the top five in the world “in terms of articles.”

“in terms of articles”? How very scholarly a statement indeed.

Here’s the entire article:

I’ve been meaning to sit down and write a piece about the role of certain Iranians in the expat community in the movement inside Iran. About Mohsen Sazegara, Makhmalbaf, Sajdadpour, Ganji, etc. I was quite taken aback when I read that Mohajerani had visited the WINEP (Washington Institute for Near East Policy – an offshoot of AIPAC). Or Sazegara and Nabavi’s push for the “Trojan Horse” (the word makes me shiver now each time I hear it). Makhmalbaf’s comments on sanctions or his claimed status as a “representative” … I can go on forever.

Well, Muhammad Sahimi has done it better than I ever could.

If you are at all interested in Iran or Iranian affairs, do not miss this article: Different Shades of Green.

The article ends with the paragraph:

The Green Movement and the struggle for democracy in Iran are the result of the sacrifices of countless courageous Iranian men and women for over a century. Their fate should be decided in Iran, not in Western capitals, particularly Washington. Iranian people are fully capable of advancing their own democratic cause.

When I see that first glimmer of spring, no matter how small or faint … the weather growing just barely warm enough for my nose not to freeze, or seeing the smallest glimpse of green on a tree on my way to school … I think of Iran, of Khuzestan, of my grandmother, of the excitement in the air this time of year … the horrible, terrible Tehran traffic and pollution which explodes as people start doing their last minute shopping … but is also sprinkled with anticipation … kids anticipating two weeks off from school, families waiting for the holidays … Spring is a beautiful time to be in Iran. And oh how much I miss it when I am not.

In my hometown of Khuzestan, which endures some of the hottest climates in Iran, spring is cool, breezy, beautiful. The naranj [seville orange] grows ripe and sweet, like nowhere else in this world. My grandfather’s garden, which he carefully attends to year round is infused with the naranj blossoms – what we call bahar naranj.

Close your eyes, tilt your head ever so gently and take a deep breath. The scent is intoxicating.

Every year, a few days before the new year, we make the long, 14 hour drive from Tehran to Khuzestan. In fact, for years, the provinces we passed on our trip were the only provinces I knew by heart: first comes Qom [known for its clerics I would watch with fascination as we drove through the city], then Arak [known for the best doogh (yogurt drink) on the planet], then Lorestan [one of the most beautiful provinces in all the country, a truly magical spectacle of nature]. During my childhood, Iran for me meant Tehran, the capital of work  and school, Qom, Arak and Lorestan, passageways … to Khuzestan … the capital of the WORLD!

We usually made it to my grandfather’s home around dinner time. And he would run to the yard, to open the garage door for us. Watching him open that huge, archaic blue door, [since, he's colored it green] and running to the yard to give him a huge, huge hug.

We spend the day among the citrus orchards, spend the nights around a huge table, talking into the wee hours of the night. Some nights, we sleep in the little house my grandfather built long ago in the orchards. A house filled with dozens and dozens of people: aunts, uncles, cousins.

Their chatter, the sound of dozens and dozens of spoons and forks during dinnertime, the whispers you hear as people talk to one another even though the lights are all out … the little birds who join us (the house has no doors when it is empty and so a few birds always nest there with us during spring) … it’s all music to my ears.

………. And that’s the story of so many of us living far from our homes. Home will always be where your heart wanders … not where your feet walk. And no matter how comfortable your surroundings, your heart shatters into a thousand pieces each and every time you remember … each and every single time you remember your grandfather peeling an orange for you he’s just picked from the citrus tree, remember that twinkle in your brother’s eye as he excitedly opens his gift … or just the breeze caressing your hair as you walk hand in hand in the garden …

I even miss the spring cleaning, as much as I always tried to run away from it. All across the city, you’ll see carpets hanging from rooftops – left to dry after a good wash by the household. The carpets are brought into the yard or roof, detergent and water is sprinkled on top … and then the kids are called into to walk as franctically as they can … to give the carpet a good, clean kick.

I love the skylines of Tehran during spring. In some streets, the carpets are hanging off rooftops, windows, front doors  … as far as the eye can see …

Here are some of photos of this years cleaning festivities.

I first wrote about Mohammad Ali Ramin, the deputy at the Cultural Ministry and Ahmadinejad BFF on November 9th.

He’s back now, with more mind-numbing statements.

Following the suspension of both Etemad and Iran Dokht, Ramin was interviewed by state TV. He said that in Europe and North America, they do not suspend publications which break the law, but rather, suspend the licence of the jouranlists responsible for the pieces and deprive them of their rights as citizens. He said that the current press laws are “putting the cultural ministry in a bind” and that he hopes the “new and improved laws which will be given to parliament soon will allow officials to do the same in Iran: not suspend publications, but go after the “delinquents and criminals” responsible for the crime.”

He continued: “look at what’s happening now! Someone who has for eight months has been reponsible for leading riots and creating chaos, is sent to prison. When he is released, he bands together with a number of other people like him [who are also criminals] and takes the reign at not one, but two publications.”

It seems he is referring to Mohammad Qouchani, the brilliant young journalist who after his release, continued on as editor in chief of Iran Dokht and Mehrnameh.

This is what we’ve come to, an illiterate criminal like Ramin labels one of Iran’s most brilliant writers a ‘delinquent and criminal’.

This is while RHANA [Reporters and Human Rights Activists Agency] quotes the editor in chief of Etemad, Behrouz Behzadi, as saying that with the suspension of the newspaper, nearly a thousand people have been put out of work and are now without income.

In 1885, Jane and Marcel Dieulafoy set foot in Susa – an ancient city in the South of Iran – after having journeyed Marseilles to Athens and then to Istanbul, Poti, Jolfa, Tabriz, Qazvin, Tehran, Isfahan, Persepolis, Shiraz, Sarvestan and Firuzabad. Much of the journey was conducted horseback and they arrived after having suffered numerous hardships and illnesses through out their journey.

The arrived in Susa via Bushehr and Mesopotamia to begin the long, grueling process of excavation. Jane has a most delightful three volume epic on her journeys throughout Iran published under the title Le Tour de Monde. At the time, Nasseraddin Shah was the absolute monarch of Iran. Quite ignorant of the benefits of history or architectural marvels, he let the French team excavate freely and with no interference. This effort led to the unearthing of the Apadana Palace at Susa, in the Iranian province of Khuzestan.

More than half a century later, Professors Grishman and Counter – French and American respectively – continued excavation in that region unearthing amonst others, what is today known as Choqa Zanbil – an Ilami temple dating back 3700 years.

With the arrival of the foreigners, Iran was faced with its first formal proposal for excavation. Having no clear idea of its benefits or reasons, the Persian government made no clean-cut guidelines for what they could – or could not – do. Of course, the Persians knew gold and jewelry were valuable commodities.  Other priceless relics made of stone were of no interest to them.

Referring to a governmental document during that time we find: “Discovered valuable objects such as gold, silver or jewelry will be the property of the Iranian government, but since the French officials have taken a lot of pain to unearth the objects, the Iranian government is permitted to sell half of these antiques to the French team at a reasonable price and should the government decide to sell the other half, the French government will be given the first priority.”

The efforts of excavation in Iran were so sumptuously rewarding that the Shah’s representative granted France exclusive rights to excavate in Iran. That was followed in 1900 by a revised agreement drafted in Paris. At the time Muzafferadin Shah was the ruler of Iran and he granted “exclusive concessions to make permanent excavations and dig out artistic and historical and ancient objects throughout Iran.”

Under such agreements the entirety of Susa was handed to the French. Today, when visiting this ancient site you will be faced with ancient white broken marble. What the French could not take with them, they blew up with dynamite.

After the constitutional revolution, parliament cancelled all monopolized concessions. The British feelings towards the rights given to France were also not completely unrelated to this cancellation.

But perhaps ever since, we Iranians have been going over the same old dilemma: Do we let the foreigner excavate and walk away with our treasures? Or, being quite powerless in excavating ourselves, do we just let our ancient treasures lie buried until a time and place when we ourselves have the power to raise them from the grave? In the process of course, always risking looting and theft? Is it better to have our treasures leave Iran, but stay safe, or should we keep them ourselves?

The hills around Choqa Zanbil and Susa are sights frequented by looters and tourists [with shovels] alike.

The most the Heritage Organization [responsible for excavations and preservation of the sights] has been able to do is to mark certain hills with a thin yellow tape indicating hidden treasures beneath. This has in fact helped the looters, and they know exactly where to look.

In Tehran, I have walked into the homes of a number of people who actually maintain a museum of their own in their house – all by buying these artifacts and objects in the black market. And while there are no formal auction houses selling these relics, there is quite a vibrant market for them underground.

I go back to this question when looking at photos of the basement of the National Museum of Iran where some of our most valuable treasures are kept. Take a look at these photos and weep.

The box is labeled “bones”

A few weeks ago, I wrote about the suspension of Mayor Qalibaf’s newspaper, Tehran-e Emrooz, following the accusation that the logo looked like a dancing woman.

Two days ago, it was reported that the Etemad newspaper was also suspended (I will have more on that today). I featured a photo of their staff in one of my posts. This is a logo of the newspaper:

Now, my friends have figured out WHY Etemad was suspended. If you too want to know the reason, look below. I suggest that if the editors of Iranian newspapers want to keep their publications afloat, they abstain from using such provocative logos. You’d think they would have figured it out by now after dozens and dozens of newspapers have been shut down in the past few years. This kind of profanity can NOT be tolerated in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Benyamin rules the day.

Given that I write mostly about Tehran, you gotta have known a Benyamin Bahadori post was coming sooner or later.

His latest album, 88 (pictured below) was one of the best selling albums of the year (although, given the amount of “illegal” music sharing in Iran and the underground market those things are very hard to measure), and he is just fresh from playing to a sold out crowd in Tehran’s Milad Tower last night. 88 has been the highest grossing album of all time in Iran, at more than 2 million albums sold.

Some of the tracks on this album and the last have a good beat, but besides that, he does not have much else going for him. Given that the underground market is ripe with the best pop music in the world, the question everyone asks is: what makes him such a popular choice? His voice is only mediocre. His lyrics are banal. His numerous attempts at plastic surgery have made him look like hundreds of other boys you’d see in a cafe in Tehran, and so his looks alone can’t be his selling point.

But I think that’s precisely what has made him so wildly popular: his familiarity. Besides that, he has a brilliant PR machine that knows just how to navigate the ever growing demand of fans and the censors at the ministry of culture. And as I mentioned, though his music overall is nothing exceptional, both with this current album and the last, he manages to put forth one or two really good songs – and that’s what carries his name far and wide. Everywhere you go in Tehran, those two songs are playing … in old, beat-up taxis, in fresh-from-the-water BMWs driven by hip 18 year olds … I bought 88 in Tehran last month, and I only play it up to the fourth track – while there are 18 songs in the album.

When he released the song that made him a household name, Donya digheh mesleh thou nadareh [the world will never seen someone else like you] (his publicist claimed the song was “leaked” which shows they must be familiar with PR gimmicks in other parts of the world), you could literally hear it coming at you from a dozen places in the street – no matter where you were standing.

You see, this is where the underground market actually is an advantage: I remember precisely Benyamin’s rise to fame, and it was basically through word of mouth. Once a few taxi drivers and students started listening to it, it spread like wild fire.

Here are more photos from last night’s concert.

Here is a Soroush cover, dating back to November 20th, 1982 featuring an article/interview with Mir Hossein Mousavi. I can’t believe it, I wasn’t even born then! The issue features an interview with Mousavi, and articles about his first year in office.

Soroush is the offial IRIB [Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting] magazine. My dear, dear friend, the late poet, Gheysar Aminpour for years was editor in chief of Sorush-e Nojavan (Sorush for Young Adults) – similar to Kayhan for Kids which I’ve previously covered.

Spend some time and try to take this in. IRIB currently will not even allow the face of Mousavi to appear anywhere on its channels or magazines. Commentators on IRIB frequently call him “the leader of the riots”, etc, etc. And once, long ago, they featured him on their front page.

These pages are 28 years old, and back then, they had nothing but praise for him.

Snippets from the article (not included in this post):

One of the most positive aspects of the current government [led by Mousavi] is their efforts at reconstruction and facilitation in impoverished regions.

Comparing the country’s economic record with last year, we see that in less than a year the government has been fairly successful at responding to the economic crisis.

[quote from Mousavi interview] Our strategic victories in battle (Iran-Iraq war), despite all military, economic and political problems, has made our foreign policy a force to be reckoned with.

[quote from Mousavi interview] Iran will continue and promote healthy economic ties so long as it does not jeopardize our sovereignty and based on a policy of respect.

[h/t Agh Bahman]

Mana Neyestani on a poster for The Fifth Anniversary of Persian Cartoon.

—————————————————————

Mana Neyestani is an Iranian cartoonist. He first became a household name when he started working for reformist newspapers like Asr-e Azadegan, Sobh-e Emrooz, Neshat, etc [since, every last one of these publications has been banned]. He made headlines when he was arrested following a cartoon he drew depicting a cockroach speaking Turkish Azeri.

Like hundreds of other jouranlists, writers and artists, Neyestani now lives far from his homeland, in exile. But his cartoons have not lost that magic touch. They are now even more avidly sought, following the June 2009 election.  I have frequently used his cartoons in my posts.

More recently, he has been drawing a cartoon strip about a family in post-election Tehran.The family’s last name is Dargir. Dargir in Persian means “in a bind – caught up in trouble”.

He himself writes regarding the cartoons:

This collection of cartoons are about a middle-class family named “Dargir”. Mr. Dargir is a middle-aged man, who is, like most of us, sometimes very traditional and other times modern. His wife Ashraf, and his son and daughter Mazi and Azi are all very political, and his father follows events even more enthusiastically than the kids. As is apparent from their name, the Dargirs are caught up in all the issues in our society today, from culture to politics to art and sports.

Just please take note: Do not generalize the Dargirs. They are not a repersentative for all of Iran and all Iranians. They are just an excuse to kid around with some of our traits and habits.

You can view the collection here.

The comic strip is now at #38. The grandfather was arrested for participating in a protest in #34. Here are a few of the cartoons with their translations:

The strip is titled: when grandfather shows off!

Grandfather flirting with old lady: Ha! I’ve been in Kahrizak for two years!

Azi [granddaughter]: He means the retirement home, not the detention center!

Friend looking at man hitting punching bag: Kami believes in Gandhi’s methods. He is practicing non-violence.

Mazi [son of family]: He looks more like Mike Tyson to me!

Friend: No! That’s not Kami! Kami is inside the punching bag!

The family has learned to protest: Ashraf, Mazi, Azi and grandpa are singing the defiant revolutionary song “my school age friend” and the father is saying in exasperation: “All I said was that I was the head of this household …”

Grandpa is in jail and forced to write a confession: “I confess to carrying a green balloon, having illegitimate relations with a Trojan horse and obtaining two videos from youtube.” Signed as “I spit in your face”. He is saying: “here! I wrote everything you wanted!” and the interrogator responds with a “!”

note: the Trojan horse method was an imbecilic suggestion by Ebrahim Nabavi for the greens to “take over” Azadi Square on 22 Bahman.

I have been wanting to write a post about the wonderful Iran Dokht magazine for a while now, but had not had the chance.

Now, it seems that’s no longer an issue. The magazine was shut down today, as was the Etemad newspaper. Here, on my desk I have the first four issues of Iran Dokht and they are staring up at me, their eyes wide in disbelief. For weeks, every Saturday, the first thing I did when I got up in the morning was go to the nearby newspaper stand and buy the latest issue of the magazine which had just been brought in. It was ever so exciting to begin leafing through the pages, each page with an ocean of things to read.

Another death … another tragedy … it breaks my heart and I feel the salty drop of tears quivering the corners of my eyes each time I hear the news … And yet, perhaps I am, what we Iranians call “kaseyeh daghtar az ash” [a bowl hotter than the soup that it is in - someone who exaggerates things] … here you can see a photo of the Etemad staff [writers and journalists] today, after receiving news of the newspapers closing.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has, for the past five years denied the brain drain in Iran (large-scale emigration of individuals with technical skills or knowledge) famously declaring that: “those who claim that we have a brain drain, are only interpreting this term the wrong way.” [that is, those who are leaving aren't really the elites with "technical skills or knowledge" that we need.]

He gave Mohsen Rezaie the same response in their televised presidential debate when Rezaie criticized him for “not asking the elites of the country to help in his cabinet”. Ahmadinejad responded that “he was gravely concerned with this stereotypical use of the word elite” – and that Rezaie and others were interpreting the word “elite” the wrong way.

This is while in the annual report on the emigration of highly educated professionals released by the IMF, Iran was ranked #1 among the 91 developing countries. [When Ahmadineajd was shown statistics which countered his own during the debates, he accused rivals of using statistics from "Zionist sponsored entities"]. IMF reported that 180,000 specialists leave Iran annually.

Deutsche Welle has an interesting report about the recent parliamentary committee formed to look into this rapid emigration which has grown ever more rapidly in the past few months. (Really, when a day comes when Shafie Kadkani leaves, what can we say for the rest of the population?)

Of particular worry is the rapid emigration of scientists at the Royan Institute and other embryonic stem cell science research facilities in Iran.

Mohammad Reza Salimi, the head of the parliamentary committee told the Farce News Agency: “increased job security, reform of management systems, honoring the privacy of research facilities, growing cooperation with Iranian scientists abroad and reform of the educational hierarchy are among the solutions offered by the committee.”

At the same time, Hamid Gourayi, the head of Royan warned that his research institutiong is losing some of its top scientists to Gulf Countries, Europe and North America.

But I guess as long as you don’t know how to wield a baton or smash 15 heads per minute, you just aren’t considered a “professional” by the current administration.

The recent Mousavi interview has been translated by a number of sources, including Washington Post, the New York Times, Tehran Bureau, and yes, Khordaad88 (Khordaad88 is the only source I know of that translated the entire text of the interview). While of course the first three organizations carry a much more professional staff, I take issue with their translation of the word “ferghe” in the context used, as “cult”.

In the end, I don’t think there is a right or wrong answer. At Khordaad88, we strive to stay faithful to the original context without making any personal interpretations. So I think it can certainly be argued that Mousavi meant cult, but, that’s making an assumption. We chose not to. The word ‘ferghe’ in Persian can have a myriad of different uses: “faction”, “party”, “clique”, “group”,  (ethnic, religious, etc) and yes, cult. But, especially in popular culture, the word cult in English has a particular negative connotation to it that the word “ferghe” in Persian does not have. (not that “ferghe” can not have a negative meaning, but cult is a much stronger word, and in the context Mousavi uses it, it is not clear if he meant cult).

So, the Khordaad88 translation is:

This [current] ruling establishment is a clique.

While other news sources have translated it as:

This political establishment is a cult.

It may be considered a minor detail, but I beg to differ. Even though I would certainly call the current Iranian rulers a weird, perverted cult, perhaps ever more ludicrous than Monsieur Raël at Clonaid, I don’t think the translation of the word “ferghe” as such is empty of controversy.

Mir Hossein Mousavi was interviewed by Kalemeh today. Khordaad88 is working on the translatin of the complete interview, and it will be released in the next few hours.

I love how he mentions the changing of the green in the Iranian flag in Ahmadinejad’s recent speeches.

Here are parts of the interview:

————————————————

.

.

.

But I say that having one or more radio and TV channels for the green movement, will only strengthen the system and help national unity. I personally am worried that these current limitations will force us to fall behind lower ranking countries in the region. I don’t see another way to protect our nation against the waves that other countries will send towards us, countries which are thinking of their own self-interest. It is absurd to think that we can control these waves by hacking, filtering and jamming satellite signals.

Either way, if the ruling establishment and the different political factions are realistic, they must know that the green movement was present for 22 Bahman. And, [they must know that] a good future for the country can only be secured by creating unity between people and varying factions of society, and not by calling a significant portion of society “dirt and dust”, “cows and lambs” and “an insignificant, limited group”. The life of our prophets and imams show that at no time did they curse or abuse those who opposed their religion. They had a high regard for human dignity, and instead of judging individuals, they always showed great mercy and kindness, in order to show the path of truth. Our people cannot tolerate anti-religious actions being carried out in the name of religion. In the Koran, when the prophet and his followers are mentioned, they are described as being kind and strong in the face of enemies. For certain, both in the time of the prophet and after, not all Muslims had the same degree of faith. Our people greatly understand the different between piety and the seeking of power in the guise of pious clothing. This [current] ruling establishment is a clique which strives to rob the very meaning of being Iranian and national solidarity. And this is one of gravest dangers we face today. Our weapon against such devious actions is uniting around our common national and religious aspirations, and relying on those visions which will result in a developed, peace-seeking Iran, throughout the country and throughout the world. It is in such a circumstance that we can hope that just like the years of the holy war [Iran-Iraq war] the entire nation will unite in the face of danger. The nation is defined as all the groups, all ethnicities, all cultures and all differing factions. Those interested in the green movement take pride in being Iranian, and all the symbols that come with that, and thus, it is quite obvious that we are very suspicious about the changing of the color of our flag, and we see this [this changing of the color] as a clear sign of the lack of concern of this current ruling establishment for our national interests, values, and culture.

In your 17th statement, you gave a number of solutions for solving this current crisis. Do you have any other suggestions besides the ones you’ve given already?

A very important aspect of the 17th statement is that the very acceptance of the existence of a crisis is a part of its solution. At the same time, I do not believe there are any sudden, abrupt solutions out of this current crisis. For example, we cannot engineer an orchestrated demonstration and fool ourselves into believing that everything is over. The important thing is that we now take steps to ensure that the crisis will be solved in the future. Just imagine if today, it was announced that all political prisoners will be freed. Before any faction or group, I’m certain that the entire nation will be glad to hear this news. Or, another action that can work to better this environment of fear, is kindness towards the people who are simply demanding their rights.

. . .

Aren’t we all?

Here’s signing off with one of my favorite songs ever.